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European Central Bank working paper series 48Abstract Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly
discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed
committee decision making in presence of external in°uence. We show that restricting
the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest poli-
tics. Moreover, there are cases where bene¯ts from increasing the number of decision
makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open com-
mittees bene¯ts from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote
is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines
in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not
the case in a closed committee where costs and bene¯ts of insincere voting only arise
when a voter is pivotal.
Keywords: Committees, interest groups, voting, common agency.
JEL classi¯cation: D71, D72, D73.
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Some committees and decision making bodies convene behind closed doors while
others openly discuss issues and/or publicly make their decisions. Examples for the
former category are juries in courts, boards of management, school admission commit-
tees and some central bank councils. Examples for the latter category are parliaments,
some parliament subcommittees, and juries in sports (among them ice skating and
boxing). Some of the committees that belong to the former category are criticized
because they lack democratic accountability. If votes are taken secretly, individual
statements and voting behavior cannot easily be tracked and constituencies can no
longer verify the activities of their representatives. Secret voting councils are never-
theless widespread. Are there are any reasons to make secret committee decisions?
This paper provides a simple argument why a closed committee may be an ap-
propriate institution in some cases. Our argument focuses on the possibility that
an external interest group attempts to in°uence committee decisions. We analyze
whether open or secret majority voting should be the rule from a social perspec-
tive in such a situation. A committee is viewed as a group of specialists with expert
knowledge which has to take a policy decision. The members have private information
about what might be the best policy and they have in principle the same interests as
the public. However, members may be subject to external in°uence from an interest
group, which favors a certain policy above all others.
In general, an interest group's attempts to in°uence the policy of a committee
may take several - legal or illegal - forms. Committee members may e.g. expect to be
molested by complaining interest group members after having made their decision.
The interested party may decide to threaten jury members, or it may promise to make
monetary transfers that are conditioned on committee members' voting behavior. In
our model we will stick to the latter form of interest group in°uence.
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 5decides and discusses behind closed doors and only releases the outcome. The second
one is a committee which releases both individual voting behavior and the outcome
of the vote. We assume that an interest group can credibly promise to condition
payments on the observable behavior of decision makers. In our context this means
that either the action of the interest group can be linked to individual voting behavior
(open voting) or to the outcome of the vote (closed voting).
We show that restricting information of interest groups may reduce the bias to-
wards special interest politics. The underlying reason for our main result is the
f o l l o w i n g .C o n s i d e rac o m m i t t e em e m b e rt h a tr e c e i v e sat r a n s f e ri fi tv o t e si nf a v o r
of a certain policy. A cost arises due to an insincere vote if this voter is pivotal. In
this case an insincere vote reduces the probability that the decision is the appropriate
one. The cost of voting insincerely is low if the probability of being pivotal is small.
The bene¯t (the transfer) however is certain. This is the reason why - even with
small transfers equilibria exist in open committees where members vote insincerely.
Consider instead the same voter in a closed committee. He knows that both cost and
bene¯t only matter in the situation where he is pivotal. He therefore only compares
transfer and bene¯t but neglects the probability of being pivotal. Therefore the price
of an insincere vote is higher.
Our paper also provides a new interesting insight into the role of the size of a
committee. One of the fundamental results in voting theory, Condorcet's famous jury
theorem, states that the delegation of a decision to more decision makers yield better
results. We show that under interest group in°uence this need not be the case when
committees meet openly. As the number of voters increases (in our example from
one to three), the cost of voting insincerely declines because the probability of being
pivotal declines. This is why in a larger open committee individual voters may be
more likely to vote insincerely.
We consider two institutional arrangements. The ¯rst one is a committee that
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Some committees and decision making bodies convene behind closed doors while
others openly discuss issues and/or publicly make their decisions. Examples for the
former category are juries in courts, boards of management, school admission commit-
tees and some central bank councils. Examples for the latter category are parliaments,
some parliament subcommittees, and juries in sports (among them ice skating and
boxing). Some of the committees that belong to the former category are criticized
because they lack democratic accountability1. If votes are taken secretly, individual
statements and voting behavior cannot easily be tracked and constituencies can no
longer verify the activities of their representatives. Secret voting councils are never-
theless widespread. Are there are any reasons to make secret committee decisions?
This paper provides a simple argument why a closed committee may be an ap-
propriate institution in some cases. Our argument focuses on the possibility that
an external interest group attempts to in°uence committee decisions. We analyze
whether open or secret majority voting should be the rule from a social perspec-
tive in such a situation. A committee is viewed as a group of specialists with expert
knowledge which has to take a policy decision. The members have private information
about what might be the best policy and they have in principle the same interests as
the public. However, members may be subject to external in°uence from an interest
group, which favors a certain policy above all others.2
1A prominent recent example is the report by Blinder et. al. (2001) on the bene¯ts of central
bank transparancy.
2There are many economic situations, where the true state of the world matters for the socially
desirable policy decision but not for an interest group. Consider for example corporate taxes. It may
be socially desirable to relieve corporate taxes if economic circumstances are truly bad and to increase
them otherwise. An interest group, consisting of ¯rms, on the other hand always prefers to pay less
taxes independently of the economic situation. Another example is a central bank's interest rate
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 7In general, an interest group's attempts to in°uence the policy of a committee
may take several - legal or illegal - forms. Committee members may e.g. expect to be
molested by complaining interest group members after having made their decision.
The interested party may decide to threaten jury members, or it may promise to make
monetary transfers that are conditioned on committee members' voting behavior. In
our model we will stick to the latter form of interest group in°uence.3
We consider two institutional arrangements. The ¯rst one is a committee that
decides and discusses behind closed doors and only releases the outcome. The second
one is a committee which releases both individual voting behavior and the outcome
of the vote. Similarly to Grossman and Helpman (1996) we assume that an interest
group can credibly promise to condition payments on the observable behavior of
decision makers. In our context this means that either the action of the interest
group can be linked to individual voting behavior (open voting) or to the outcome of
the vote (closed voting).
We show that restricting information of interest groups may reduce the bias to-
wards special interest politics. The underlying reason for our main result is the
f o l l o w i n g .C o n s i d e rac o m m i t t e em e m b e rt h a tr e c e i v e sat r a n s f e ri fi tv o t e si nf a v o r
of a certain policy. A cost arises due to an insincere vote if this voter is pivotal. In
this case an insincere vote reduces the probability that the decision is the appropriate
one. The cost of voting insincerely is low if the probability of being pivotal is small.
The bene¯t (the transfer) however is certain. This is the reason why - even with
small transfers - trembling hand perfect equilibria exist in open committees where
decision. Some interest groups may always favor lower or higher rates while the general public may
be interested in a state-dependent decision. Another example is an academic institution deciding
whether a student may pass an exam. The student is interested to pass the exam independently of
his true achievements while society may want to condition the outcome on these achievements.
3Our model actually ¯ts well with any situation where the interest group has to invest more
ressources in order to change the payo® of a committee member.
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 8members vote insincerely. Consider instead the same voter in a closed committee.
He knows that both cost and bene¯t only matter in the situation where he is pivotal.
He therefore only compares transfer and bene¯t but neglects the probability of being
pivotal. Therefore the price of an insincere vote is higher.
Communication among committee members may severely limit an interest group's
ability to in°uence decisions. We analyze the role of communication among committee
members before voting. With communication it is never optimal for the interest group
to pay transfers to a minority in the open voting setting. Making payments contingent
on the minority¶s voting behavior leads to windfall gains and therefore the transfers
are only made contingent on the actual policy chosen by the committee. Consider for
example the case of paying a transfer to one committee member in an open voting
setting contingent on his individual vote. In the communication stage the member
who votes insincerely will reveal his true type to the other members, and accept
the payment, while the other members will vote strategically. It follows that the
best policy from the public¶s point of view is chosen. Anticipating this behavior the
interest group will not be willing to make payments contingent on individual votes of
minorities in the open majority voting setting.
Our paper also provides a new interesting insight into the role of the size of a
committee. One of the fundamental results in voting theory, Condorcet's famous jury
theorem, states that the delegation of a decision to more decision makers yield better
results. We show that under interest group in°uence this need not be the case when
committees meet openly. As the number of voters increases (in our example from
one to three), the cost of voting insincerely declines because the probability of being
pivotal declines. This is why a larger open committee may make individual voters
more vulnerable to external pressure.
The paper is related to a growing literature on strategic voting in committees
(See Gerling et al., 2003, for a recent survey). Austen Smith and Banks (1996) and
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 9Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999a,b) have pioneered the role of strategic
voting which plays a major role in our analysis as well. Coughlan (2000), Gerardi
and Yariv (2002), and Doraszelski, Gerardi and Squintani (2003) have written on
communication in committees. Communication is also analyzed in the second part of
our paper. The value added of our analysis with respect to those papers lies in the
study of external in°uence on committee members.
Mukhopadhaya (2003) and Persico (2000) have also derived counterexamples to
the Condorcet jury theorem. These counterexamples focus on the role of incentives for
information acquisition while our model focuses on external interest group in°uence.
Gersbach and Hahn (2003) have studied the issue of open versus closed voting
in a setup where the committee members' preferences are not known to the political
principal(s). The principal's reappointment decision is based on whether he may
expect to ¯nd a better agent elsewhere.
The paper is also related to the huge literature on the role of special interest
politics. In particular it is related to the paper by Grossman and Helpman (1996)
who have analyzed the bidding behavior of interest groups who try to in°uence the
choice of electorate platforms by political parties. Our paper instead analyzes a
binary decision when the political decision makers have less than perfect information.
Another di®erence is that the decision makers decide directly on the adopted policy
while - in Grossman and Helpman - the electorate chooses among two competing
platforms.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline our model. Section 3 has
the equilibrium for a given transfer scheme. In section 4 we derive optimal transfers
and section 5 has the main result on the comparison of both voting rules. In Section
6 the role of communication among committee members before voting is analyzed.
In section 7 we study the role of the size of a committee under the two voting rules.
Section 8 studies the robustness of our results in the common agency case with two
opposing interest groups. Section 9 concludes.
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2.1 Agents
A homogenous population delegates a binary decision to a committee. For simplicity
it is assumed that the committee has three members, i =1 ::3. Each of these members
obtains a private signal about the true state of the world s, which can be either 1 or
0. Each of the two states is realized with probability 1=2. The signal of individual i
is denoted si. Each signal is correct with probability p. A policy x,w h i c hi s1o r0 ,i s
chosen according to majority voting. We denote the individual votes by xi 2f 0;1g.
2.2 Preferences
Each member i derives the utility:
ui = y + ti (1)





1i fx = s
0i fx 6= s
: (2)
The public¶s payo® is given by n¢y where n is population size. In the absence of
transfers each committee member therefore wants to choose according to the general
public¶s interest.
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implies that the interest group always prefers the policy y = 1 independent of the
true state of the world. It is further assumed that µ is known to the committee
m e m b e r sa sw e l l .
2.3 Timing
The timing is such that ¯rst the interest group chooses a transfer scheme (t1 (¢);t 2 (¢);t 3 (¢)).
These transfers will be conditioned either (i) upon the observable individual votes, xi,
or (ii) upon the chosen policy x. For simplicity we assume that the transfer scheme
is known to all three committee members. Along the lines of Grossman and Help-
man (1996), we assume that these transfers are credible. Next nature draws a state
s. Each of the two states is realized with probability 1=2. Each committee member
privately observes the signal si which is correct with probability p. Finally, com-
mittee members choose a policy according to majority voting and transfers are paid
in the pre-speci¯ed way. Society and committee members observe ex post whether
the decision was appropriate. However, we assume that this is not veri¯able. Hence
committee members can not be directly remunerated for correct decisions.
2.4 Surplus
We assume that the interest group is small in the sense that its gain µ does not
outweight society's loss (n) from an incorrect decision. Therefore the surplus increases
if the probability of inappropriate decisions decreases.
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3.1 Equilibrium with open voting
In this section it is analyzed how committee members react to a given vector of
transfers under open and secret voting schemes. We require an equilibrium of this ¯nal
stage to ful¯ll the conditions of (i) a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and (ii) a trembling
hand perfect equilibrium. We abbreviate this equilibrium criterion as THPB. Each
player has four pure strategies: truthful voting, always voting for one of the two
alternatives and inverse voting. We call players who vote truthfully sincere voters.
We concentrate on pure strategies equilibria. The ¯rst proposition characterizes the
pure strategies equilibria under open majority voting.
Proposition 1 Consider a committee with three members and open majority voting.
Consider the case that the interest group makes payments contingent on the individual
voting behavior.
(i) A THPB equilibrium where one member always votes in favor of alternative
1 while two others vote truthfully exists if and only if ti ¸ (2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1),a n d
t¡i 2 [0;¹ t],w h e r e¹ t =
2p¡1
2p2+1¡2p and where ¡i refers to the other two committee
members.
(ii) A THPB equilibrium where two members always vote in favor of alternative
1 while one votes truthfully exists if and only if the two receive transfers tj ¸ 2p¡ 1,
while the third agent receives a transfer which is not too large.
(iii) A THPB equilibrium where all three members always vote for alternative 1
exists for all t>0.
(iv) A THPB equilibrium where all members vote truthfully exists for all t<
(2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1).
(v) There is no other trembling hand perfect pure strategies equilibrium with trans-
fers conditioned on individual voting behavior.
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 13Proof: see Appendix.
It is noteworthy that - for all strictly positive transfer vectors - there always
exists a trembling hand perfect equilibrium where all voters always vote in favor of
the interest group's preferred alternative (part (iii) of Proposition 1). This is due
to the fact that - with trembles vanishing the cost of voting insincerely approaches
zero. Paying transfers to all three agents therefore seems costless. However, for small
transfers, another equilibrium exists that is preferable from the committee members'
point of view.
Remark 1 The THPB equilibrium (iv) is considered as focal compared to (iii) if
t<(2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1), because in this case all committee members derive a higher
utility in equilibrium (iv) than in (iii). Otherwise equilibrium (iii) is considered as
focal by the same reasoning.
A consequence of this remark and of Proposition 1 is that buying all three votes
is cheapest if t1 = t2 = ">0a n dt3 =( 2 p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1).
3.2 Equilibrium with secret voting
Under secret majority voting all transfers can only be made contingent on the outcome
of the vote. Hence, costs and bene¯ts of voting insincerely only occur in the event of
being pivotal. This is di®erent from the case of open voting where transfers could be
made contingent on individual votes.
Proposition 2 Consider a committee with three members and secret majority voting.
Consider the case that the interest group makes payments contingent on the policy
chosen by the committee.
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 14(i) A THPB equilibrium where member i always votes in favor of alternative 1
while two others vote truthfully exists if and only if ti ¸ 2p¡1 and t¡i not too large.
(ii) A THPB equilibrium where two members always vote in favor of alternative 1
while one votes truthfully exists if and only if the two receive transfers tj ¸
2p¡1
1¡2p+2p2
and t¡j < 2p ¡ 1.
(iii) A THPB equilibrium where all members always vote for 1 exists for all t ¸
2p ¡ 1.
(iv) For all t<2p ¡ 1 a THPB equilibrium exists where all committee members
vote truthfully.
(v) There is no other trembling hand perfect pure strategies equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix.
One immediately sees that paying transfers to all three committee members is
more costly under closed than under open majority voting.
Corollary 1 The equilibria in Proposition 2 are also equilibria in a setting with open
majority voting, given that the interest group makes payments contingent on the policy
chosen by the committee.
Proof Obvious. Q.E.D.
4O p t i m a l t r a n s f e r s
In this section we determine the optimal choice of the vector of transfers for the two
regimes. We begin with the optimal choice of transfers that are made conditional on
individual votes (ti(xi)) in the case of open voting.
Proposition 3 Consider the case with open majority voting and transfers made con-
tingent on the individual voting behavior. The interest group¶s optimal strategy is to
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 15pay (2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1) to one agent and to pay the other two agents an arbitrarily
small positive amount i® µ ¸ 2 ¢ (2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1). Otherwise it is optimal not to
promise any transfers.
Proof Paying transfers to one or two agents is more expensive than paying
transfers to three agents. Paying transfers to three agents costs (2p ¡ 2p2)(2p ¡ 1).
Not paying transfers to any agent yields the decision x = 0 with probability 1=2.
Hence, paying transfers to three agents is optimal if
µ
2
¸ (2p ¡ 2p
2)(2p ¡ 1): (4)
Q.E.D.
Under secret voting the interest group's optimal policy turns out to be somewhat
more complex.
Proposition 4 Consider the case with secret majority voting and transfers made con-
tingent on the policy chosen by the committee. The interest group¶s optimal transfer
strategy depending on the (µ;p) combination is given in Figure 1 with:




3 (3 agents versus 2 agents)
(ii) µ =
12p¡5¡6p2+4p3




2 (2 agents versus 1 agent)
(iv) µ =4 :0
2:0p¡1:0
1:0¡2:0p+2:0p2 (2 agents versus no agent)
(v) µ = :5
¡6:0p2+4:0p3+1:0
p(¡1:0+p) (1 agent versus no agent)
Proof The bene¯t for the interest group in each of the interesting equilibria de-
rived in Proposition 2 is maximized if the weak inequalities are replaced by equalities.
The expected bene¯t from paying a transfer to one member is then given by:
B




)(µ ¡ 2p +1 ) : (5)


























Figure 1: The interest group¶s optimal strategy under closed voting.
The expected bene¯t from paying transfers to two members for the interest group
is given by:
B
2 = µ ¡ 2(
2p ¡ 1
1 ¡ 2p +2 p2): (6)
The expected bene¯t from paying transfers to all members for the interest group
is given by:
B
3 = µ ¡ 3(2p ¡ 1): (7)






Comparing these bene¯ts yields Figure 1 and (i) - (v). Q.E.D.
According to ¯gure 1, for all probabilities p there is a valuation µ above which the
interest group starts to distort the committees decision. This critical valuation rises
with the quality of the three decision makers. Hence, the decision maker's quality
has an indirect e®ect on the quality of the overall decision by raising the cost of an
insincere vote.
























Figure 2: Comparison of the two voting rules.
5 Comparison of the two voting rules
The previous results enable us to make a welfare comparison of both voting systems.
If the highest possible realization of the interest group's valuation of policy 1 is large
enough then we have a strict ranking of both alternatives.
Proposition 5 The secret voting scheme is strictly preferred from a social point of
view.
Proof As a direct consequence of the comparison of the bene¯ts for the interest
group derived in the proofs of Proposition 3 and 4 it turns out that for some (µ;p)
combinations the two schemes are equivalent4 and for others the public strictly prefers
the secret voting scheme, as depicted in Figure 2. Since the public only knows the
distribution function F(µ) it is obvious that the expected bene¯t is strictly greater
under the secret voting scheme. Q.E.D.
4T h ec a s ew h e r et w oa g e n t sv o t ei n s i n c e r e l yi sc o n s i d e r e dt ob ee q u i v a l e n tt ot h eo n ew i t ht h r e e
agents, since in both cases the probability of x = 1 approaches unity, given that the " trembles go
to zero.
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In reality committee members very often have the opportunity to talk with each other
before voting occurs. The communication might in°uence the voting behavior and the
transfer strategy of the interest group. Therefore, in this section, an extended setting
is analyzed, where a message stage is introduced before voting occurs. In this stage
the members simultaneously announce their signals and these announcements become
common knowledge among the committee members. The interest group however does
not know these announcements.
Lemma 1 All equilibrium strategies derived in the settings without communication
augmented by uninformative messages in the message stage, constitute equilibria un-
der the respective voting scheme with communication.
Proof Obvious. Q.E.D.
There is a multitude of other equilibria in this extended setting and only some
economically interesting ones are derived in this paper.
Proposition 6 Consider a situation where a minority is promised transfers under
open voting with N committee members. There is an equilibrium where all members
announce their signal truthfully in the message stage, the majority votes for the best
policy and the minority votes insincerely for any transfers greater than zero. For
any transfers greater than zero, this is the focal equilibrium, if a minority is o®ered
transfers.
Proof Consider the situation where a minority I is o®ered transfers. Consider the
potential equilibrium strategy where all members i 2 I of the minority tell the truth
in the message stage and vote for 1 in the voting stage. The potential equilibrium
strategy for a member j 2 J of the set of all members who are not o®ered a transfer
is to reveal the truth in the message stage and to vote:
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 19- against his own signal if either fsj =0a n d
PN
n=1 b sn ¸ N
2 g or fsj =1a n d
PN
n=1 b sn < N
2 g:
- sincere otherwise.
The strategies of the sincere voters guarantee, that the policy is chosen, which
would also be chosen without any transfers. The strategies of the insincere voters
are optimal, since they maximize the probability that the correct policy is chosen.
Consider an insincere voter i. Due to the strategies of the sincere voters, agent i
is never pivotal in the voting stage. However, he will always obtain the transfers if
he votes for policy 1. Therefore it is optimal for him to do so in the voting stage.
Furthermore by telling the truth in the message stage he maximizes the likelihood
that the correct policy is chosen, which also maximizes his utility. Therefore his
strategy constitutes an equilibrium strategy.
As soon as the interest group o®ers transfers to a minority of committee members,
truthful communication in the message stage is focal, since there is no way to obtain
a higher utility for the insincere committee members, which is equal to the transfer
plus the value of the best possible decision. Therefore the considered equilibrium is
focal for transfers to a minority under open voting. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 Under open voting with communication the interest group never promises
transfers to a minority contingent on the individual voting behavior.
Proof Otherwise the interest group pays something without in°uencing the prob-
ability that the favored policy is chosen, which is worse than to do nothing. Q.E.D.
As soon as there is communication, transfers to a minority lead to windfall gains for
the insincere committee members without any repercussions on the likelihood of the
policy chosen. Of course, this result depends on the assumption that the committee
members have in principle the same interests regarding the policy decision. Otherwise
it is to be expected that truthtelling is in general not optimal in the message stage.
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Proposition 7 Consider a committee with three members and open majority voting,
with prior communication.
(i) There is no equilibrium where all agents communicate truthfully and where
they always vote for the best alternative (i. e. the one with most signals), given that
t>0 for all agents.
(ii) There is an equilibrium where all agents communicate truthfully and where
they always vote for 1, given that t>0 for all agents.
(iii) There is an equilibrium where all agents communicate truthfully and where
they always vote for the best alternative, given that t =0for all agents.
Proof (i) Assume that si = 0 for all i and suppose two agents vote truthfully.




As noted above there are many equilibria in the setting with communication.
Fortunately it is not necessary to derive the optimal transfer strategies in order to
¯nd the optimal voting scheme from a social point of view.
Prop osition 8 From a social point of view secret voting is weakly preferred to open
voting in the presence of communication among committee members.
Proof Under open voting, the interest group has the basic choice either to give
transfers to a certain number of agents contingent on the individual voting behavior
or contingent on the policy chosen by the committee. The interest group will choose
the alternative which yields the highest utility. Under secret voting in contrast, the
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 21interest group can only make the transfers contingent on the policy chosen by the
committee.
(1) Assume that under open voting the interest group prefers to make transfers
contingent on the individual voting behavior to making them contingent on the policy
chosen (or a mixture of both). Necessarily this implies that secret voting is to be
preferred to open voting from a social point of view, since transfers are being paid
less often5.
(2) Assume that under open voting the interest group prefers to make transfers
contingent on the policy chosen to making them contingent on the individual voting
behavior. In this case open voting and secret voting are equivalent from a social point
of view. Q.E.D.
7 Enlarging the committee
The argument that speaks in favor of closed voting is that transfers received from
outsiders are only motivating the agent in case that his vote is pivotal in the com-
mittee. Under open voting the transfer is always important while the cost only arises
when an individual vote is pivotal. Moreover, we know that the probability to cast
the pivotal vote declines in the size of a committee. This is why one should expect
that a larger committee is more vulnerable to external pressure if it is organized as
an open committee. Indeed one can easily proof the following statements:
Proposition 9 Consider a committee with n members under closed voting.
(i) A THPB equilibrium where all members vote in favor of alternative 1 exists i®
ti ¸ 2p ¡ 1.
5µ is not known by the general public.
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i® ti · 2p ¡ 1.
(iii) The cost of paying transfers to all committee members increases linearly.
Proof (i) and (ii) Like in the case with three members. (iii) follows from (i).
Q.E.D.
Under closed voting the individual transfers needed are independent of the size of
a committee. Therefore the total sum of transfers needed in order to buy the entire
committee are increasing in committee size. This is di®erent under open voting.
Proposition 10 Consider a committee with n members under open voting.
(i) A THPB equilibrium where all members vote in favor of alternative 1 exists i®
ti > 0.









2 (1 ¡ p)
n
2 ¢ (2p ¡ 1).
(iii) The amount of money needed in order to ensure that at least one committee
member always votes in favor of alternative 1 is declining in n.
Proof Like in the case with three members. Q.E.D.
These results indicate that it may be more di±cult to ensure that the bene¯ts
from increasing the size of a committee can fully be reaped. This becomes clear when
we consider the comparison of a single decision maker and a committee with three
members under open voting.
Proposition 11 It is less expensive to buy all votes of an open committee with three
members than to buy the decision of a single decision maker.
Proof We know that buying an open committee with three members costs (2p¡
2p2)(2p ¡ 1). Buying the decision of a single decision maker costs 2p ¡ 1. Q.E.D.
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states that more decision makers yield better results. Under interest group in°uence
this need not be the case when committees meet openly. As the number of voters
increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines because the probability of being
pivotal declines. This is why a larger open committees may make individual voters
more vulnerable with respect to external pressure.
8C o m m o n a g e n c y
This section analyzes whether the main results of the previous sections are robust
when two interest groups try to in°uence the committee¶s decision. We are particu-
larly interested in the case, where the two groups are socially irrelevant and drop out
of any welfare considerations.6 In such a setup one interest group favors alternative
0 while the other always is in favor of alternative 1.
We provide theoretical reasons, why the lobbying of opposing interest groups,
which are socially irrelevant, may lead to undesirable distortions on the policy chosen
by a committee. We show that a mixed strategies equilibrium of the corresponding
(discontinuous payo®) game exists. Such an equilibrium has the property that the
interest group's e®orts do not always cancel out. It may rather be the case that the
di®erence between transfers induces some agents to vote insincerely. Conditions are
derived, which guarantee that secret voting is strictly preferred to open voting from
a social point of view.
6Note that in the one interest group case, it has to be argued that the interest group is small, in
order to neglect it in the welfare analysis.
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The previous section¶s assumptions with respect to the timing, the committee mem-
bers' information structure and the true state of the world are maintained. A commit-
tee member¶s utility is given by ui = y +ti0 +ti1,w i t hti0 and ti1 being the transfers
paid by the interest groups 0 and 1 respectively to member i.
Interest group 1 ¶ s utility is given by u1 = µx¡
P3
i=1 ti1 and group 0 ¶ s utility is given
by u0 = µ(1¡x)¡
P3
i=1 ti0. The parameter µ is common knowledge and mirrors both
interest groups' bene¯t from the policy chosen. Therefore interest group 0 prefers
policy x = 0 and group 1 prefers policy x =1a n db o t hg r o u p sh a v ea ni d e n t i c a l
valuation for the respective preferred policy. As a consequence the interest groups'








i=1 si < 1
2
1o t h e r w i s e
:
The game is a modi¯ed ¯rst price sealed bid auction. Both interest groups make
simultaneous announcements about their transfers and based on these o®ers, which
become common knowledge among the committee members (but not to the opposing
interest group), each committee member casts a vote. The main di®erence with
respect to the ¯rst-price sealed bid auction is that the di®erence between the o®ers
has to be above a certain threshold in order to ensure that the vote changes.
8.2 Secret voting scheme
Under secret voting the transfers can only be made contingent on the policy chosen
by the committee as a whole, i. e. the o®ers tij are made contingent on x (and per
de¯nition can not be made contingent on the individual vote yi).
T h ec o m m i t t e em e m b e ri ¶ s optimal vote xi:




si if ti;j6=si ¡ ti;¡j=si · Eu(xi = si;t j;t ¡j) ¡ Eu(xi = j;tj;t ¡j) ´4 i;tj;t¡j;si
j otherwise
:
i.e. i votes sincerely if the di®erence in the transfers ti;j6=si ¡ ti;¡j=si (the ¯rst
term being the transfers from the group, which does not coincide with i ¶ s signal si)7
is smaller than the cost from voting insincerely.
The following Propositions will refer to Figure 3.
Figure 3
Proposition 12 (i) For all (µ;p) combinations in region II in Figure 3, there exists
only one equilibrium. In this equilibrium the transfers satisfy tij =08i;j.T h i s
equilibrium maximizes the social surplus.
(ii) For all (µ;p) combinations in region I in Figure 3, there is no equilibrium
guaranteeing that the socially best policy is chosen.
7For example, if si = 0 (and therefore member i in principal prefers to vote for policy / group 0)
then ti;j6=si ¡ ti;¡j=si = ti1 ¡ ti0 is the net bene¯t obtained from the transfers, given that i accepts
the transfer.
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anteeing the socially best policy exists.
Proof (i) In order to proof part (i) consider the potential equilibrium where
both interest groups do not o®er positive transfers. Given that group ¡j does not
pay transfers, what is the best response of group j.G r o u p j now is in the same
situation as in a setting with only one interest group. The best responses for di®erent
(µ;p) combinations are given in Proposition 4. As can be seen, for all combinations in
region II in Figure 3 it is optimal for group j not to pay positive transfers. Given that
j does not pay transfers, the same argument holds for ¡j, which establishes the equi-
librium. Since no committee member votes insincerely, this equilibrium maximizes
social welfare.
(ii) The proof of (ii) proceeds in two steps. In step (a)i ti ss h o w nt h a ta n y
equilibrium in pure strategies does not maximize social welfare and in (b)i ti ss h o w n
that any equilibrium in mixed strategies can not yield the socially best policy (which
is not trivial per se), as well.
(a) Assume that there is an equilibrium in pure strategies yielding the socially best
policy. In this case tij6=si ¡ ti¡j ·4 i;tj;t¡j;si 8i;si. Furthermore, if an equilibrium is
welfare maximizing, then each interest group has a probability of 1
2 of being chosen.
Given that the probability of being chosen is 1
2 and tij6=si ¡ ti¡j ·4 i;tj;t¡j;si 8i;si
the "best response" satisfying these conditions for group j is max(0;t i¡j ¡4i;tj;t¡j;si).
The "best response" for group ¡j is de¯ned analogously. Obviously they do not have
a ¯xed point except at ti¡j = tij = 0. This however can not be an equilibrium. (From
part (i) and Proposition 4 we know that except in region II in Figure 3 it is optimal
for an interest group to pay transfers to a number of members, given that the other
group does not make any payments.) Therefore there can not be an equilibrium in
pure strategies which always yields the socially best outcome.
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certainty within the intervals (tij;ti¡j) de¯ned by the welfare maximization condition.
Furthermore, if welfare is maximized, then each interest group has a probability of
1
2 of being chosen. Since the expected utility is then Euj = 1
2(µ ¡ tj), an agent can
improve by choosing tij with certainty (for any other transfer within the interval with
¾ij(tij) > 0 his utility decreases, whereas the probability that the favored policy is
chosen remains 1
2). Therefore there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies, which also
yields the socially best policy.
(iii) The proof can be found in the Appendix.
8.3 Open voting scheme
Under open voting the transfers can be made contingent on the policy chosen by the
committee as a whole or on the individual voting behavior. In the latter case the
o®ers tij are made contingent on xi and possibly on other member¶s votes.
Proposition 13 (i) For some (µ;p) combinations in region II in Figure 3, there
exists only one equilibrium. In this equilibrium the transfers satisfy tij =08i;j.T h i s
equilibrium maximizes social welfare.
(ii) For all (µ;p) combinations in region I in Figure 3, there is no equilibrium
guaranteeing that the socially best policy is chosen. An equilibrium not guaranteeing
the socially best policy exists.
(iii) For some (µ;p) combinations in region II in Figure 3, there exists an equilib-
rium, which can not guarantee that the socially best policy is chosen.
Proof In order to proof part (i) it su±ces to give examples of these equilibria.
Consider the potential equilibrium, given the combination (µ =0 ;p), where both
interest groups do not pay any transfers. Given that group ¡j does not pay transfers,
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chosen, it prefers not to pay transfers.
The proof of (ii) proceeds in two steps. In step (a) it is shown that an equilibrium
exists and in (b) it is shown that any existing equilibrium can not yield a welfare
maximizing policy.
(a) Analogous to Proof of Proposition 12 (iii).
(b) Analogous to Proof of Proposition 12 (ii).
In order to proof part (iii) it is easiest to depart from equilibrium (i). As soon
as (µ;p) is such that a deviation of one interest group from the strategies in (i) is
pro¯table, then (i) does not apply anymore and by the same reasoning as in (ii) we
can establish that an equilibrium exists, which in general is not welfare maximizing.
Now, consider (µ;p)c o m b i n a t i o n si nr e g i o nI Ii nF i g u r e3 ,a n da s s u m et h a ti n t e r e s t
group ¡j does not pay any transfers. Interest group j now is in the same situation
as in a setting with only one interest group. From Proposition 3 it is known, that
there are (µ;p) combinations in region II, where making transfers tij contingent on
xi only, is better for group j than not to pay any transfers. Hence a deviation from
the "no transfers equilibrium" is pro¯table and by the same reasoning as in (ii) there
exists an equilibrium for these (µ;p) combinations, which is in general not welfare
maximizing. Q.E.D.
8.4 Comparison of closed and open voting
Propositions 12 and 13 enable us to make a partial welfare ranking of the two alter-
native voting schemes. According to both propositions, there are (µ;p) combinations
where closed voting is better for society than open voting. In those cases open voting
generates a policy bias while closed voting always yields the appropriate decision. For
another set of (µ;p) combinations, both open and closed voting yield the appropriate
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bias. Without any additional information on the type of equilibrium we are not able
to provide a welfare ranking in those cases.
Proposition 14 Either µ and p are such that
(i) closed voting always guarantees that the best policy from a social point of view
is chosen, whereas under open voting the best policy is in general not chosen, or
(ii) closed voting and open voting yield the best policy from a social point of view,
or
(iii) open and closed voting lead to a policy bias.
Proof (i) From Proposition 12 (i) it is known that for all (µ;p) combinations
in region II in Figure 3 no committee member votes insincerely under secret voting
and therefore this equilibrium is welfare maximizing. From Proposition 13 (iii) it is
known that for some (µ;p) combinations in region II in Figure 3 committee members
vote insincerely under open voting and that whatever the equilibrium strategies are,
this equilibrium is in general not welfare maximizing.
(ii) Follows from Proposition 12 (i) and Proposition 13 (i).
(iii) Obvious. Q.E.D.
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has provided a simple argument in favor of the protection of committees
from external in°uence. According to our argument, the decision quality is higher in
a closed committee because incentives to give in to external pressure do not decline
with the probability of being pivotal. Moreover, we have shown that under open
voting, a larger number of decision makers may make lower quality decisions.
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 30This leads to the question whether and when there are good reasons to make
committee meetings public instead. One argument may be that a true representation
of the delegating population requires that constituencies see what their particular
representative has done. A more complete analysis than the present one would take
such agency problems into account. Such an analysis would focus on the trade-o®
between the accountability to (heterogeneous) constituencies and the in°uence of
special interest groups. It might require a di®erent veri¯ability structure where - ex
post - the appropriateness of the decision is at least partially veri¯able.8 In such an
analysis one could endogenize both the incentives provided by the general population
and those of the interest groups that attempt to a®ect the policy choice.
10 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Consider a potential equilibrium where one member
i always votes in favor of alternative 1 and the other agents j and ¡j vote sincerely.
Consider trembles that make the sincere voters vote insincerely with probability ">0.
They vote according to their signal with probability 1 ¡ ". The remaining decision
maker i knows that his decision is only important if he is pivotal. As " goes to zero,
the probability to be pivotal goes to:
lim
"!0 p
piv =2 p(1 ¡ p): (9)
The expected utility from voting truthfully, given that member i obtained signal
0 and is pivotal is:
8Besley (2003) considers a model where the public may vary a politician's salary in order to in-
crease the quality of decisions. Incentives are provided when reelection is linked to the policymaker's
past performance. Gersbach (2003) studies the impact of additional incentive schemes provided by
the public or by the politician himself.
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The expected utility from voting insincerely, given that the third member obtained
signal 0 and is pivotal is:
Eu
lying
i j(si=0);ppiv = p
(sj=0;s¡j=1;s=1jsi=0) + p
(sj=1;s¡j=0;s=1jsi=0) + ti (11)
=( 1 ¡ p)
2p +( 1¡ p)
2p + ti
=2 ( 1 ¡ p)
2p + ti:
The committee member votes insincerely if transfers ti solve:
0 ¸ Eu
truth





2 ¡ 2p + ti
ti ¸ (2p ¡ 2p
2)(2p ¡ 1):
Next consider a sincere voter. Suppose ¯rst that his signal is 0. He is pivotal if




2. The expected damage from voting insincerely is
p2













Next consider the case where the signal of a sincere voter is 1. He is pivotal if the
other sincere voter votes 09. Hence the two states of the world are equally likely if he
is pivotal. Voting truthfully is one best reply in this situation.
9or if epsilon trembles make him pivotal. We can ignore this case for obvious reasons.






(ii) Consider a potential equilibrium where members 1 and 2 always vote in favor
of alternative 1 and the third agent votes sincerely. Consider trembles that make one
insincere voter ¡j vote for 0 with probability " and that make the sincere voter i
vote insincerely with probability ". From the proof of (i) it is known that the other
insincere voter j occurs an expected loss
Eu
truth
j j(sj=0) ¡ Eu
lying
i j(sj=0) (15)
=( 1 ¡ ")
2[(p
(si=0;s¡j=0;s=0jb si=0;b s¡j=1;sj=0) + p
(si=0;s¡j=1;s=0jb si=0;b s¡j=1;sj=0))
¡(p
(si=0;s¡j=0;s=1jb si=0;b s¡j=1;sj=0) + p
(si=0;s¡j=1;s=1jb si=0;b s¡j=1;sj=0) + tj)]
+2(1 ¡ ")"[:]+"
2[:]
=( 1 ¡ ")
2[(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)] + 2(1 ¡ ")"[:]+"
2[:]
if he is pivotal and votes insincerely when his signal is sj = 0. This loss has to be
compensated by transfers:
tj ¸ (1 ¡ ")
2[(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)] + 2(1 ¡ ")"[:]+"
2[:]( 1 6 )
which approaches tj ¸ 2p ¡ 1a s" goes to zero.
Consider the member who votes sincerely. Truthful voting only matters if this
agent is pivotal. The agent does not learn anything by being pivotal and therefore
his loss from lying in this case is equal to 2p ¡ 1. Therefore he will vote truthfully if
the transfer is not too large.
(iii) Consider a potential equilibrium where all members always vote in favor of
alternative 1. Consider trembles that make two players vote in favor of alternative
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1 ¡ ". The remaining decision maker i knows that his decision is only important if
he is pivotal. He does not learn anything from the fact that he is pivotal because the
voting behavior of the others is independent of their signal. Hence, conditional on
being pivotal, the loss from not reporting the own information is 2p ¡ 1. He always
votes for policy 1 only if
ti >p
piv (2p ¡ 1): (17)
The left hand side represents the transfers received for voting insincerely - provided
that the signal is 0. The right hand side represents the expected cost of lying - again
provided that the signal is 0. Note that the cost only obtains if the voter is pivotal,
i.e. with probability ppiv. While the bene¯t from lying is realized independently of
this.
As " goes to zero, the probability to be pivotal goes to zero as well. Hence, for all
transfers ti there is an "0 so that for all "<" 0 voting for alternative 1 is a symmetric
"-constrained equilibrium.
(iv) Consider a potential equilibrium where all members vote truthfully. Consider
trembles that make 2 players vote in favor of alternative 0(1) with probability ">0
if their signal is 1(0). The remaining decision maker knows that his decision is only
important if he is pivotal. As " goes to zero the probability to be pivotal is the same
as for the insincere voter in (i): lim
"!0 ppiv =2 p(1 ¡ p). The expected utility from
voting truthfully, given that the decision maker i obtained signal 0 and is pivotal is:
Eu
truth
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tained signal 0 and is pivotal is:
Eu
lying
i j(si=0);ppiv = p
(sj=0;s¡j=1;s=1jsi=0) + p
(sj=1;s¡j=0;s=1jsi=0) (19)
=( 1 ¡ p)
2p +( 1¡ p)
2p
=2 ( 1 ¡ p)
2p + ti
The decision maker votes sincerely if
0 <E u
truth









Hence, for all transfers t that satisfy
t<(2p ¡ 2p
2)(2p ¡ 1): (21)
voting sincerely is a symmetric "-constrained equilibrium.
(v) Consider an equilibrium where member 1 always votes in favor of alternative
1, member 2 always votes in favor of alternative 0 and member 3 votes thruthfully.
Member three either learns nothing from being pivotal. Hence he behaves like a single
decision maker. Truthful voting is a best reply if his transfer satis¯es t · 2p ¡ 1.
Player 1 learns from being pivotal that either (i) player 3's signal is 1 or (ii) that
trembles have made player 3 and player 2 vote for 1 and 0 respectively. If his signal is
0 then both alternatives are equally likely in the case without trembles. With trembles
alternative 0 is superior. Voting for 1 does therefore require a small transfer.
Player 2 learns from being pivotal that (i) player 3 has signal 0 ii) that trembles
have made player 3 and player 1 accidentally vote for 0 and 1 respectively. If his own
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negative in order to ensure trembling hand perfection. If his signal is 0 then 0 is more
likely.
The other possible equilibria can be excluded easily with a similar argument.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2(i) Consider a potential equilibrium where one mem-
ber i always votes in favor of alternative 1 and the other agents j and ¡j vote
according to their signal. Consider trembles that make j and ¡j vote against their
signal with probability ">0. They vote according to their signal with probabil-
ity 1 ¡ ".A s " goes to zero, the di®erence in expected utilities between lying and
truthtelling for the insincere voter i goes to:
Eu
truth
















2p +( 1¡ p)
2p + p






= p(1 ¡ p)
2 +( 1¡ p)p
















2(1 ¡ p)+p(1 ¡ p)
2
+p(1 ¡ p)
2 + p(1 ¡ p)
2 + p
2(1 ¡ p)( 2 8 )
= ¡3p
2 +3 p:
Voting insincerely pays if
ti ¸ 2p ¡ 1: (29)
Consider the sincere voter j. Truthful voting matters only if this agent j is pivotal
and his signal is 0. Given that he is pivotal he looses
lim
"!0 (1 ¡ ")
2[(p
(s¡j=0;si=0;s=0jb si=1;sj=0) + p
(s¡j=0;si=1;s=0jb si=1;sj=0))( 3 0 )
¡(p





(s¡j=0;si=0;s=0jb si=1;sj=0) + p
(s¡j=0;si=1;s=0jb si=1;sj=0))
¡(p
(s¡j=0;si=0;s=1jb si=1;sj=0) + p
(s¡j=0;si=1;s=1jb si=1;sj=0))
> 0
as soon as he lies, where agent ¡j votes truthfully and the insincere voter votes
for policy 1. Therefore he will vote truthfully.
(ii) Consider a potential equilibrium where two members j and ¡j always vote in
favor of alternative 1 and the other agent votes sincerely. Consider trembles that make
one insincere voter ¡j vote for 0 and that makes the sincere voter i vote insincerely
with probability ", respectively. As " goes to zero, the di®erence in expected utilities
between lying and truthtelling for voter j goes to:
ECB • Working Paper No 293 • November 2003 37Eu
truth














(y=1jtruth;sj=0)tj ¡ ((1 ¡ p)











= p(1 ¡ p)
2 + p
2(1 ¡ p)+( 1¡ p)
2p +( 1¡ p)p
2 =2 p ¡ 2p
2;
and p(y=1jlying;sj=0) =1 .
The strategy of voter j is optimal if the expected transfers at least compensate
the di®erence, i. e.
tj ¸
2p ¡ 1
¡2p +2 p2 +1
: (33)
Consider the sincere voter. Truthful voting only matters if this agent is pivotal.
This agent does not learn anything by being pivotal and therefore his loss from lying
in this case is equal to 2p ¡ 1. Therefore he will vote truthfully.
(iii) Consider a potential equilibrium where all members always vote in favor of
alternative 1. Consider trembles that make 2 players vote in favor of alternative
0 with probability ">0. They all vote in favor of alternative 1 with probability
1 ¡ ". The remaining decision maker knows that his decision is only important if he
is pivotal. He does not learn anything from the fact that he is pivotal because the
voting behavior of the others is independent of their signal. Hence, conditional on
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he votes insincerely only if
p
piv ¢ ti >p
piv ¢ (2p ¡ 1) (34)
, ti > (2p ¡ 1):
The left hand side represents the expected transfers received for voting insincerely
- provided that the signal is 0. The right hand side represents the expected cost of
lying - again provided that the signal is 0. Note that the cost and bene¯t only obtain
if the voter is pivotal, i.e. with probability ppiv.
(iv) Consider a potential equilibrium where all members vote truthfully. Consider
trembles that make 2 players vote in favor of alternative 0(1) with probability ">0
if their signal is 1(0). As " goes to zero, the di®erence in expected utilities between
lying and truthtelling for the insincere voter i goes to:
Eu
truth
























= p(1 ¡ p)
2 +( 1¡ p)p
2 = p ¡ p
2:














2(1 ¡ p)+p(1 ¡ p)
2
+p(1 ¡ p)
2 + p(1 ¡ p)
2 + p
2(1 ¡ p)( 4 1 )
= ¡3p
2 +3 p:
The member under consideration does not accept the transfer given that the
expected transfer does not compensate the di®erence, i. e.
ti < 2p ¡ 1: (42)
Part (iv) of the Proposition follows immediately.
(v) See Proof of Proposition 1(v).
Q.E.D.
11 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 12 (iii)
Notice that the discontinuities in group j¶ s payo® function are con¯ned to the set
A
¤(j)=f(t0;t 1)jti1 = ti0 + 4i;t¡i1;t¡i0;si=0 or ti1 = ti0 ¡4 i;t¡i1;t¡i0;si=1 for 8i
with tj =( t1j;t 2j;t 3j)a n d4i;t¡ij;t¡i¡j;si=j being the expected loss from voting
insincerely for member i, given that the member obtains signal si = j.T h e s ec o s t s
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may induce other voters to vote insincerely, in°uencing i ¶ s voting behavior.
Before proceeding to the proof of Proposition 12 (iii) it is useful to state Lemma
2.
Lemma 2 In our setting there exists a function u1(t1;t 0) with (t1;t 0) 2 A¤(j) such
that:
lim
µ1!0 inf u1(t1 + µ1e
+;t 0) > u1(t1;t 0) >u 1(t1;t 0)( 4 3 )
with e+ 2 B3+ and






P r o o fo fL e m m a2Notice that (43) is well de¯ned in our setting, since u1(t1 +
µ1e+;t 0) >u 1(t1;t 0)a sµ1e+ gives a little bit more transfers to any committee member
than at the point of discontinuity, as µ1 goes to zero. The members for whom t1 is
critical will therefore vote in favor of group 1 instead of being indi®erent between the
two groups, which raises group 1¶s utility.
The next step is to verify that (43) and (44) are consistent in our setting. Notice
that at a point of discontinuity, the utility uj of group j goes up if the transfers
are approached from above (e. g. tj + µje
+
j with µj ! 0) and in this case (for
given t¡j) the utility of group ¡j necessarily goes down.10 This holds, because more
members will vote for group j. Now the de¯nition of (44) implies that for whatever
sequences approaching the point of discontinuity, we either have the situation that
one utility rises and the other falls, as just described, or both utilities are in the limit
10To see this, consider an interest group¶s expected utility Eu = p0(µ ¡ t), with p0 being the
probability that the favored policy is chosen. In the relevant cases µ ¡ t ¸ 0. Therfore if p0 goes
down, so does the expected utility.
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appropriate uj 2 (lim
µj!0 inf uj(tj+µje+;t ¡j);u j(tj;t ¡j)) makes (43) and (44) consistent
in this application.11 In the latter case, since uj(t1;t 0) >u j(t1;t 0) 8j (see (43)), it
follows that there exist uj(t1;t 0) such that (43) and (44) are consistent. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2( iii) The proof proceeds as follows. In Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986) Theorem 5¤ (D-M Theorem 5¤) the existence of an equilibrium
in games with continuous action sets and discontinuous payo® functions is derived,
given that the payo® functions are weakly lower semi-continuous and the sum of the
utilities is upper semi-continuous. Unfortunately this is not the case in our setting,
since the sum of the payo® functions is not upper semi-continuous. But, based on
our utility functions, we will de¯ne a game satisfying the conditions of D-M Theorem
5¤ where an equilibrium exists. In the next step it is shown that the equilibrium
for the modi¯ed game is also an equilibrium for the original game, which establishes
existence.12 The de¯nitions used in the proof are largely taken from D-M, but can
also be found in "Appendix: general de¯nitions".
The modi¯ed game:





u1(t1;t 0)i f ( t1;t 0) 2 A¤(1)
u1(t1;t 0)o t h e r w i s e
(45)
with an arbitrary u1(t1;t 0) satisfying Lemma 2.
Existence:
- Existence with the modi¯ed utilities:
11Notice as well that in this application lim
µj!0
inf uj(tj + µje+;t ¡j)=l i m
µj!0
sup uj(tj + µje+;t ¡j):
12The idea of this proof is analogous to D-M Theorem 5 a.
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semi-continuous and b uj(t1;t 0) is weakly lower semi-continuous.
Upper semi-continuity of b u1(t1;t 0)+b u0(t1;t 0):
If (t1;t 0) = 2 A¤(j), then uj(:) is continuous and therefore also is the sum b u1(t1;t 0)+
b u0(t1;t 0). If (t1;t 0) 2 A¤(j) then the sum is upper semi-continuous by construction
(i.e. by (44) and (45)).
Weak lower semi-continuity of b uj(t1;t 0):
If (t1;t 0) = 2 A¤(j), then uj(:) is continuous and therefore also is b uj(t1;t 0). Now if
(t1;t 0) 2 A¤(j):




µ0!0 inf b uj(tj + µ0e;t¡j)dv(e)] +
Z
B3+[lim
µ0!0 inf b uj(tj + µ0e;t¡j)dv(e)] ¸ b uj(tj;t ¡j)
By (43) and (45) lim
µ1!0 inf b u1(t1+µ1e+;t 0) > u1(t1;t 0)=b u1(t1;t 0) for any (t1;t 0) 2




µ0!0 inf b uj(tj +µ0e;t¡j)dv(e)] > b uj(tj;t ¡j). Since b uj(:) is bounded and
arbitrary little mass can be put on any e 2 B3¡, there exists a continuous measure
v(e) such that X' holds and therefore b uj(:) is weakly lower semi-continuous.
Since b u1(t1;t 0)+b u0(t1;t 0) is upper semi-continuous and b uj(t1;t 0) is weakly lower
semi-continuous, the game [(Tj; b uj);j =1 ;0] has a mixed strategy equilibrium (b ¾1; b ¾0)
due to Theorem 5¤ D-M.
- Existence in the original game:
Now it will be shown that (b ¾1; b ¾0) is an equilibrium for the original game.
Choose b t1 with b ¾1(b t1) > 0. Then
Z
b u1(b t1;t 0)db ¾0 ¸
Z
b u1(t1;t 0)db ¾0 for all t1 2 T1.( 4 6 )
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1
close to b t1 such that
R
b u1(t0
1;t 0)db ¾0 >
R
b u1(t1;t 0)db ¾0, a contradiction of (46). Hence
Z
b u1(b t1;t 0)db ¾0 =
Z
u1(b t1;t 0)db ¾0: (47)
But from (43) and (45), b u1(t1;t 0) ¸ u1(t1;t 0) for all t. Therefore,
Z
b u1(t1;t 0)db ¾0 ¸
Z
u1(t1;t 0)db ¾0: (48)
But (47) and (45) imply that
Z
u1(b t1;t 0)db ¾0 ¸
Z
u1(t1;t 0)db ¾0;
i.e. b ¾1 is a best response to b ¾0 in the original game. Analogously for b ¾0.
>From (ii) it follows that any existing equilibrium does not maximize the social
surplus.
Q.E.D.
12 Appendix 3: general de¯nitions
De¯nition 1 B3 : Surface of the unit-sphere in R3, with the origin as its centre.
De¯nition 2 B3¡ : At least one component of an element e =( e1;e 2;e 3) of B3¡ is
negative or zero.
De¯nition 3 B3+ : B3+ = B3nB3¡:
De¯nition 4 Upper semi-continuity:
Af u n c t i o nuj : T ! R1 is upper semi-continuous if for any sequence ftngµT
such that tn ! t, lim
n!1 supuj(tn) · uj(t).
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Let e 2 B3, and let µ0 2 R+.T h e nui(ti;t ¡i) is weakly lower semi-continuous in
tj if for all tj 2 A¤
j(j) there exists an absolutely continuous measure v on B3 such




µ0!0 inf uj(tj + µ0e;t¡j)dv(e)] ¸ uj(tj;t ¡j):
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